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 Introduction 
 
The Administrative Office of the Trial Court sponsored the Massachusetts Office of 
Dispute Resolution (MODR) at the University of Massachusetts Boston to prepare this 
working paper depicting the state of research on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 1, , 
, 
2
3 4 for the purpose of compiling an evidence base for public funding of court ADR 
programs.   
The format of the paper is a summary of research and an outline of decision-making 
models for legislators and budget analysts.  To inform this work, a workshop was held 
with directors of court-connected community mediation centers focused on 
communicating the value of mediation services to the state.  Now, as a Working Paper, 
this work will be employed as a guide by the Trial Court Standing Committee on Dispute 
Resolution and court ADR programs for planning implementation and funding strategy.5 
The term “Working Paper” implies launching a process of inquiry and planning. 
This paper is presented in a style similar to advising a senior executive making an 
investment decision. There is therefore a “return on investment” orientation to the 
Working Paper. We brought to bear an outside, management science perspective as 
recommended in the Monan Report6. In contrast to that report this is an operational level 
analysis. We suggest readers review that report first, if they have not done so already, as 
it outlines the executive level, strategic thinking about advancing the court system – a 
regime within which court-connected ADR must operate.  
While the Monan Report outlines recommendations for improvement of the judiciary, 
recommendations specific to ADR are not included. Operational recommendations for 
ADR are yet to be developed. In addition, the implementation of ADR should be included 
in service and outcome evaluation systems deployed in the court. 
 There is a need now to integrate this work with the formation of Trial Court policy on 
court-connected ADR, in the context of actions taken in response to the Monan report, 
such as time standards for case management, and then aligning this with the legislative 
budget decision process. 
The basic idea of this Working Paper is to encourage a broad overview of the field rather 
than emphasizing details of particular research projects (i.e., the purpose of this summary 
is insight not numbers).  The last compilation of information on the value of ADR for the 
state was completed in February 1998, “Report to the Legislator on the Impact of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution on the Massachusetts Trial Court.” The present work 
draws on more than twice as many studies. At this time they are provided as a roughly 
70-page annotated bibliography in draft form. For the purpose of compiling a larger 
collection of summary data, the Working Paper draws to a large extent on the work of 
other reviewers of the field.  
This data is presented, in this Working Paper, in a framework to enable a yes/no decision 
for budget decision-makers. This is done by dividing the analysis into a set of simpler 
models and asking whether the investment in ADR makes sense based on each model 
taken individually; then tallying the votes. This approach makes the task of interpreting 
this data simpler for the reader. In other words, one could look at the data for each model 
and ask whether the data tends to lean on the side of a return on investment or not?  
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Formal decision analysis in this regard, would necessarily take into account the risk 
adversity / risk affinity of the decision maker(s). For the purpose of this Working Paper, a 
risk adverse position is generally adopted, reflecting a conservative approach to the 
budget decision. The conservative stance entails setting reasonable expectations 
regarding benefits and assessing the potential of the downside or loss. 
There is very little formal evaluation data specific to Massachusetts court-connected 
ADR that is less than seven years old. So too, there does not appear to be a substantial 
record of evaluation of pertinent performance measures of the judicial system that would 
permit a comparative analysis. Massachusetts is not however unusual in this regard.7
The strength of the existing data in the field is in establishing some bounds on the 
distribution of results of implementing ADR. The implementation of ADR in 
Massachusetts is not monolithic; it is largely left up to each court and the initiative of 
local ADR practitioners. So considering the broad distribution of results of ADR studies 
in the field would probably more accurately reflect the distribution of results to expect 
within Massachusetts than a particular study of a program in one or several 
Massachusetts courts. It is reasonable to presume that Massachusetts’ implementation of 
ADR would perform within the bounds of those distributions. Massachusetts has a 
longstanding history of implementing ADR in various programs throughout the state. 
Based on their previously adjudicated success, a number of these programs, such as the 
Multi-Door Courthouse and the court ADR programs of the Massachusetts Office of 
Dispute Resolution, have served as models for other states. These programs then served 
as subjects in further research. So, in the absence of timely Massachusetts specific data, 
and in the interest of more realistically representing the distribution of expected results 
than can be inferred from data studies of several Massachusetts specific programs, we 
adopt the technique of portfolio analysis. This is a technique very common in the 
investment community and increasingly applied within organizations for their own 
projects.8 Some of the parlance in the following pages is drawn from this realm, for 
example, “risk”9 and “uncertainty,”10 “aversion to loss,” “return on investment,” and so 
forth.  
The analysis which follows is course-grained. It is analyzed with respect to sensitivity to 
variation in the results reported in studies as they pertain to the effect on the yes/no 
answer on the pertinent model. A benefit of the portfolio approach is that the broad 
distribution of results in the data set accommodates the variation in performance 
objectives of the court system, and situational differences of individual courts. A value in 
the analysis is surfacing considerations regarding the assumptions of the decision-maker. 
The modularity of the approach, and affinity of models with different performance 
objectives, enables weighting according to legislative or court system’s policy directives.  
We note the resource commitment to this endeavor has been two and a half person weeks 
sponsored by the Trial Court and four person weeks contributed by MODR of work 
conducted over a two month period. The project also enjoyed the contribution of over 
thirty people as listed in the acknowledgements section. It also enabled MODR to engage 
other researchers with an interest in the nature of this work.  
In preparing the following analysis over one thousand documents were assembled in 
electronic form with full-text indexing providing an ongoing resource for research.  
MA Office of Dispute Resolution, Working Paper, January 2006. Version 6.doc   4
In closing please note that the author does not consider that the above compilation 
constitutes research in the field of ADR. While it might be considered to be within the 
realm of meta-analysis, the work at this stage is overly reliant on secondary resources, 
sacrifices distinction-making amongst cases in favor of broad managerial overview, and 
sacrifices statistical nuance in favor of presenting a view of the field to the non-scientist. 
These are limitations with respect to the strictures of scientific method. The purpose of 
this work is rapid assembly of a decision-making tool to foster structured dialogue 
amongst the court, community mediation centers, and budget decision-makers. 
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 Overview 
The purpose of framing the research in the following models is to assist the court and its 
court-connected mediation programs in their ongoing dialogue with the funding decision-
makers in addressing the question: Is state funding of community mediation centers and 
court ADR generally a worthwhile investment? As a means of setting forth components 
of an analytic framework, the following simplified financial models are offered to draw 
out salient aspects of the nature of the investment. The simplified models are employed 
primarily for the purpose of illustrating the investment in terms of classic financial 
models familiar to a budget analyst. These models intend to provide guidance in framing 
the funding decision. They are presented from a conservative stance – that is guiding 
where there are good levels of certainty, low levels of risk, and low downside, regarding 
return on investment. 
Simplified Model 1: ADR Services Viewed as Outsourced 
Contractual Services 
Introduction 
Suppose that the state contribution to community mediation centers were viewed as a 
contract to provide mediation services to the courts. A simplified input output model over 
time is drawn from the Administrative Office of the Trial Court.11
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Model 
From the perspective of this model, the state is protected from the risk of cost-
overrun because the nature of the appropriation is as a fixed-price contract – that 
is, cost-overruns are absorbed by the mediation centers and their network of 
volunteers. For example, if mediation consumes significantly more time than 
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normally expected, the community mediation centers do not submit an additional 
charge to the court; indeed there is no chargeback system at all. 
Are a reasonable number of mediations conducted in comparison to the size of the 
contribution? Is this approach to acquiring services competitive with respect to 
the market? Estimates by the Trial Court of the total number of mediations 
indicate that the average “cost” per mediation is likely to be far below market 
value.12 Estimates by mediation centers of “in-kind” service provided by 
volunteers indicate a breakeven point for state support of the center at roughly one 
third of market value of the same service contracted on an hourly basis by the 
court. For example, a prototypical center that receives $50,000 from the state, 
which harnesses 1,000 volunteer hours, can be viewed as delivering mediation 
services at $50/hr, whereas the market rate is around $150/hr. This very simplified 
analysis suggests that if the state were to issue a request for proposals to outsource 
mediation services the contract administrator would be hard-pressed to find 
bidders. 
It is notable, that in this “contract” model, there is no limit to the number of cases 
referred by the court to the centers. In this case the state is protected from a much 
larger potential cost-overrun should there be a larger number of cases referred 
given the same state contribution to the centers. Is there evidence that the courts 
and the state benefit from this control of the financial risk of cost-overrun in terms 
of volume?  There has been fairly consistent growth in the total number of 
mediations provided while annual state allocation to the community mediation 
centers has varied considerably. Secondly, prior to the currently more organized 
state support, the community centers steadily delivered mediation services, in 
many cases actually subsidizing the court through their own fundraising. Thirdly, 
while their service load generally continues to increase, a number of centers do 
not request any increase in funding. 
The state could probably derive even more benefit in this regard. Over the past 
few decades, through a variety of educational and training venues, the size of the 
qualified volunteer base in Massachusetts has grown substantially. The Trial 
Court estimates over 500 volunteers in the network of sponsored centers, with a 
previous estimate of nearly 2000 across the state. There are indications that this 
resource is underused, that is, from a resource perspective, there is overcapacity.13 
Secondly, indications in Massachusetts14, 15 reflect the findings of studies in 
many states that the utilization rate for mediation in cases for which it is 
appropriate is often low, perhaps as low as 25%.16 With respect to this simplified 
model, viewing provision of mediation services as a fixed-price contract without 
designating or limiting the expected number of mediations to be provided, the risk 
of cost-overrun to the state is in underutilization. Utilization in cases appropriate 
for mediation is primarily a function of the referral rate by the court. 
Therefore, when viewed as a “contract” for services, the risk of “cost” overrun is 
primarily under the control of the courts as a function of their referral rate. A 
review of literature by Hedeen, regarding the nature of referrals, highlights 
research by Mika that “the most powerful influence toward referring cases is a 
word-of-mouth recommendation.”17 Consistent congressional advocacy, court 
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leadership, a properly orchestrated system of incentives, and measurement system 
to improve utilization, supported by community centers working in partnership 
with the courts to improve the dynamics of referrals are all measures to improve 
utilization.18 The danger is unintentionally increasing the rate of inappropriate 
referrals. 
Discussion 
In summary, from the perspective of this simplified model of the state investment as 
“contract” the evaluation of volume of mediations and average “cost” per case (as an 
apportionment of state funding to the centers) demonstrates “contract” performance 
advantageous to the state. Risk management of “cost” overruns, primarily under the 
control of the courts, is also to the advantage of the state.  
Counterpoint – On the other hand, suppose that the court dramatically increased its 
utilization rate. Unless the growth in referrals was somehow indexed to state support of 
community centers, their coordination resources would likely be overwhelmed. At that 
point either more funding on a cost per case basis for the programs would have to be 
provided or ADR services would have to be moved internally to be provided by court 
personnel. 
Counterpoint - As in most analogical thinking, the real insight comes from looking at 
where the analogy falls short. In Massachusetts, state funding of community mediation 
centers is not a “contract.” The funding primarily goes to supporting infrastructure, not 
paying fees for services. The services provided are coordinated by the centers with the 
delivery of the service made by uncompensated volunteers. The model is inappropriately 
narrow in considering the benefits to the state based solely on comparative costs of 
outsourcing with respect to the court rather than the broader, total cost/benefit picture. 
The infrastructure supports many activities at the community level beyond handling 
referrals from the court. The model also presumes mediation will be offered and thus 
does not address comparative costs to the court of eliminating mediation. Another option 
to consider is internalizing mediation services completely within the court versus 
“outsourcing,” a question addressed in the next model. 
In order to compare the value of investment in court-connected ADR, it would be 
appropriate to consider where else in the state budget there is a contract with a private 
service provider for an unspecified and to a large extent unlimited volume of service 
requests, at a fixed price, in which the court and the state are protected from the risk of 
cost overruns. Public agencies may operate under this type of public funding but are there 
other such funding arrangements executed with private vendors? If so, these would be an 
interesting basis for comparing the nature of the earmark to community centers viewed as 
a contract. 
Simplified Model 2: ADR Services Viewed as an Internal 
Court Function  
Introduction 
Suppose internalizing mediation services within the courts were considered. There are 
examples of states which provide a high percentage of mediation directly through the 
courts. Perhaps the most extensive statewide system is Florida. The tracking of ADR in 
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Illinois is representative of the breadth and diversity of ADR implementations across a 
state. Such an arrangement may also enable additional innovation in earlier engagement 
with previously reported success.19
Model 
The first point to highlight from the perspective of this simplified model is that 
the state funding to the centers is primarily employed for infrastructure. If the 
courts took on the task of providing mediation services within the courts 
themselves, and available infrastructure already being paid for could be reused, 
that is, the cost of additional infrastructure investment eliminated, could it save 
the state money? Let us further suppose that the courts bypass the centers to 
access their network of volunteers and that direct delivery of mediation services 
remains uncompensated. Let us also suppose there are no additional transition 
costs, but that the current court staff is already fully loaded. Would this provide 
savings to the court and to the state? 
An estimate of the additional court staff can be made from two perspectives. One, 
the Massachusetts Housing Court does internalize ADR services to a large extent. 
It requires a staff of 25 both to coordinate services and serve as neutrals. The 
volume of non-housing ADR interventions is much larger. A second basis of 
estimates is simply replacing the function of community center staff. Presume at 
least one court staffer would be required to replace each currently funded 
community center. The number of additional court staff would again at least be 
greater than twenty. An increase in court budget, accommodating at least twenty 
additional staff would be greater than the total budget request of the community 
centers. Given the comparative volume of housing ADR interventions versus non-
housing, the number of additional staff required is probably much higher. Such 
budgets are in place in California and are far larger, by any metric or ratio, than 
that allocated by Massachusetts. 
In the case that the state chose to redirect funds from the community mediation 
centers directly to the courts they would lose the cost overrun protection brought 
to light in the model above.  
Discussion 
In considering the justification for an operating budget, it is often useful to consider some 
basis for comparison with respect to another course of action toward which the funds 
could be allocated. Would the cost-benefit analysis of internalizing court-connected 
mediation justify a budget allocation to the court? Such an analysis must of necessity 
compare alternative venues of investment, in this case internalizing versus outsourcing. 
While this is a natural mode of analysis in the financial community, and in industry, and 
in many public policy systems, this type of thinking is not much in evidence within the 
current budget process. Nor is there much of a comparative research base to support such 
analysis.  
A difference in this model, compared to states which internalize mediation would be in 
the cost of transition of Massachusetts to such a system. There is almost no research 
concerning transitions from one type of system to another. 
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What is the likelihood of funding this approach to provision of mediation services? 
Budget allocations to the courts in this area have been decreasing. Indeed, the Uniform 
Rules, which call for a coordinator in each court – to interact with the community centers 
and pro bono service providers (and not as ADR neutrals) goes largely unfulfilled in the 
non-housing arenas. 
Counterpoint – A good argument could be made for the potential of improved 
efficiencies and increased utilization through the internalization of ADR services as has 
been done within the Housing Court in Massachusetts. Unfortunately there is no solid 
research base comparing in-court versus court-connected community mediation centers. 
Therefore such a decision must of necessity address substantial risk in conversion of the 
system. Should such a path be chosen, experimentation in selected courts, which are 
leaders in integrated case management, would be the appropriate venue. The time 
required for launch and evaluation of such pilots would probably require 3-5 years prior 
to statewide roll out. 
Simplified Model 3: ADR Services Viewed as a 
Mechanism of Court Efficiency 
Introduction 
Another narrow view of a budget justification for supporting mediation of any kind is 
viewing it as an investment in a process improvement program as a means of reducing 
costs20 to the court. It can be framed as follows.  
Model 
State funding of a particular community mediation center can reasonably be 
expected to perform within the wide range of costs and benefits previously 
evaluated and reported for the variety of mediation services in its portfolio. What 
would be an appropriate basis of comparison for an investment with a similarly 
low level of volatility in terms of investment performance? The preclusion of 
cost-overrun, via a fixed-price unlimited services contract, can be interpreted as 
an investment vehicle with low volatility and risk. A reasonable comparison 
would be investment in a municipal bond or Treasury note. The hurdle rate 
therefore would be returns on the order of less than 10%, probably around 4-6%. 
While there are studies which conclude there is no discernable effect of mediation 
services on costs, and even some studies which suggest that mediation is more 
costly for certain types of cases, the majority of studies suggest cost savings 
greater than that expected for investment in a bond or Treasury note, and some 
present stellar returns.  
If the median of the distribution of returns is even as low as in the range of 10%-
12% cost savings, an investment is on a par with returns expected of a well 
diversified financial investment portfolio; better than many mutual funds. Yet it 
likely enjoys a much lower volatility than the mutual fund market because it is a 
fairly mature service delivery process, which expends resources in very small 
increments. The evidence of cost studies that do report savings to the court 
accruing from court-connected ADR, especially when part of an integrated court 
management system, is generally higher than 20%. 
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Discussion 
There are a number of studies which report cost savings to the court at 10% and above. It 
is interesting to note that in several interviews with people familiar with the research base 
the opinion was expressed that 10% savings was not compelling. But as an investment 
vehicle these returns are outstanding as compared to an alternative investment at similar 
risk. A 10% cost savings to the court, for an investment in ADR, is twice the return on 
investment, which ought to be expected for an investment vehicle with a low risk profile. 
Counterpoint: The returns are probably not as great as the typical hurdle rate expected of 
other process improvement investments such as for information technology. IT project 
investments are typically heavily discounted to accommodate the likelihood of cost 
overruns. Typical expected annual return on investment for IT is around 30%.  
A shortfall of this analogy is that the investment in mediation has no cash-out mechanism 
– that is the returns are not liquid. Furthermore, the cost savings, if accrued, and in order 
to be realized, must be accompanied by a managerial objective for either reducing staff, 
or redirecting resources. This is something difficult to do, although other states have 
demonstrated such.  
A conservative stance on the research base for court cost reduction is that in comparison 
to many other metrics, this one is fairly immature. Most all the studies reviewed lack 
financial sophistication.21 Many of the court cost studies which provide good detail on 
costs incurred for specific cases, do not include comparative control groups or 
randomized sampling. There is widespread agreement that the evaluation of cost is 
contingent on context, situation, case type, degree of integration with court management 
systems, spatial location, amount of training of the referring coordinators, and so forth. 
Some reviewers of the field conclude there is not strong evidence that there is any effect. 
A small, but vocal set of researchers, who consider ADR “second rate” justice, attack the 
extant research base on the effect of court costs. So too, cost studies are extremely 
expensive to conduct. The cost of the oft-cited RAND report on the topic,22 was four to 
eight times the total annual Massachusetts state budget for court-connected ADR. The 
critical response23 to the RAND report suggests that a broad consensus was not reached 
on the results. A major part of the controversy is whether it is appropriate to compare the 
costs of court-connected ADR to that of trials at all since most cases are resolved without 
going to trial with or without ADR.24  
An earlier work by Hensler at RAND presaged some of the difficulties in conducting the 
RAND CJRA study. “What is the evidence that ADR programs actually achieve cost 
savings for taxpayers…? The issue is not whether individual litigants can achieve cost 
savings by using ADR in specific disputes – the answer to that question is almost 
certainly yes. Rather, the question is whether courts or litigants can achieve aggregate 
cost savings – reductions that show up on the bottom line – by substituting ADR for 
litigation in large classes of disputes. The answer to this question is still largely 
unknown.”25
In the absence of sound data, compiled by the courts, an alternative indicator regarding 
the bottom-line effect of ADR is suggested. The high rate of endorsement of ADR by 
lead users, such as corporations, and the expanding use of ADR in corporate law, can 
serve at least as proxy indicators in this regard.26
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Is there a high risk of a downside for investing in court-connected ADR? “Could 
investing in court-connected ADR actually significantly increase costs? There appears to 
be no compelling evidence that aggregate costs to courts are increased across all 
situations. Indeed, there are generally cost savings when the implementation of court-
connected ADR is accompanied by other changes in case management. There is however, 
some suggestion in the available data that, because of the positive expectations of ADR, 
an unintended consequence of implementing ADR may be to increase the filing of 
claims. This may act to increase costs.  
Another example of a suspected, unintended effect is the hypothesis is that as parties and 
their lawyers become facile with the mediation process, some may tend to revise their 
plans more often, entailing more revisits to the court. This is not a well substantiated 
overall finding. Yet, it presents an interesting problem in the design of research which 
seeks to ascertain actual costs. Bounding the scope of inquiry as the comparative cost of 
the resolution associated with one filing misses the effect on costs throughout the life-
cycle of the court’s involvement in addressing the underlying problem. Expanding the 
scope of inquiry to include the effect of revisits on cost would be better. This too would 
fall short of evaluating the trade-off of fairly minor costs for additional visits likely to be 
of higher quality with the likely improvement in compliance and decreased, much higher 
costs of enforcement. Measuring actual costs requires a systems dynamics perspective27, 
 28 and a life-cycle orientation.  
A decision not to fund community programs must necessarily address the potential risk of 
increasing court costs – since the majority of studies do report improvement in this 
regard. In addition, if not funded, there is an increased likelihood that some community 
programs will fold. Following a decision not to fund these programs, the court assumes 
the liability of transition costs to provide ADR by other routes, or will engender the exit 
costs of eliminating ADR as a service. 
In summary, Model 3 can be interpreted as follows:  
 Expected returns should probably be much lower than returns for riskier 
investments in process improvement such as that for information technology. 
Comparison with bonds seems reasonable.  
 The evidence base and reviewers of the evidence base are generally supportive of 
a decision to invest in ADR presuming a) the emergence of new regime of 
performance accountability as called for in the Monan Report; b) integration of 
ADR referrals with court management systems; and c) monitoring of service and 
outcome objectives applied throughout court services that enable the timely 
steering of ADR implementation. 
 There is a high level of uncertainty in projecting cost savings to the court, due to: 
a lack of data in the overall field as well as that specific to Massachusetts; no 
commonly accepted standards for metrology (as there is in measures of 
satisfaction); ongoing controversy regarding the scope of inquiry and the basis of 
comparative analysis; insufficient economic and financial discipline in the ADR 
research community; and the varied influence of contextual factors specific to the 
courts being measured. In this regard, data cited which pertain to cost effects on 
court operations ought to be considered unrefined or anecdotal.  
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 Projected cost savings to the court, resulting from an investment in ADR, as they 
pertain to a diversion of court resources or a build-down in court staffing should 
probably not be made until an integrated court management system and 
evaluation baseline are in place. Until this transpires, it is unlikely that actual, 
bottom-line savings will be realized. If gains are realized, it is unlikely the court 
would know it and therefore the “savings” probably won’t be converted 
efficiently. 
 It is instructive to compare the yes or no decision for Model 3 on the basis of risk 
aversion to loss.  
o If an investment in ADR is made is there a high expectation that this will 
lead to an increase of cost to the court? No. Across the broad spectrum of 
implementation the results are mixed. There is not a compelling evidence 
base that demonstrates investments in ADR are consistently associated 
with higher costs to the court. Indeed, the RAND report concluded there 
was no significant effect on costs.29 
o If an investment in ADR is not made is there a high expectation that this 
will lead to an increase of costs to the court? Presuming ADR referrals are 
still made to the community programs a risk of concern is losing capacity. 
If ADR services are offered in another manner, or if ADR is eliminated as 
a service, then there will be transition costs. And of course, if there is a 
significant cost savings to ADR, then it will not be realized.30 
On its own, this model illustrates the danger of adopting a narrow bound to return on 
investment. Investment decision makers are increasingly concerned with total cost. The 
question is what is the appropriate scope of concern? From the perspective of the state, it 
would seem that consideration of total cost to the state and its citizenry, rather than 
simply the operation of the court would be appropriate. We take up consideration of the 
value provided litigants in the next model. 
Simplified Model 4: ADR Services Viewed as a Quality 
Improvement Measure 
Introduction 
Perhaps the most consistently reported benefit of providing mediation services in any 
format is the significant improvement in party satisfaction. The term “significant” means 
incontrovertible statistical correlation of benefit.31 Many if not most of the studies 
provide a comparative basis with respect to a proper control group, for example, of 
disputes that were appropriate for mediation but took the litigation route. Many studies 
include randomized studies that confer a high degree of confidence in the findings. 
“Satisfaction”, in particular, “satisfaction with the process”32, is a widely employed 
metric amongst the ADR research community. “Satisfaction” as a metric has been 
cultivated over the past three decades, is fairly consistently applied, and backed up well 
by quantitative statistical approaches. The predominant body of evidence is that parties to 
a mediation are more satisfied with mediation as compared to litigation – regardless of 
whether the outcome is in their favor or not. That is an amazing, prevalently reported 
finding, which has enjoyed a broad consensus for over two decades and in a large variety 
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of contexts. The decision to invest in ADR as a means of improving quality is supported 
by a robust evidence base. 
Historians of the ADR movement commonly cite the 1976 Pound Conference’s concern 
with dissatisfaction as a launch point for ADR.33 The development of measures of 
satisfaction was directly linked to this purpose. In the following, a narrower consideration 
of the effect of quality improvement on return on investment is considered. 
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A summary of the number of studies in the annotated bibliography reporting mediation 
satisfaction levels. 
Model 
A strategy to curtail growth in court budgets can productively focus on curtailing 
preventable costs. Measures of satisfaction probably serve as a common indicator 
that directly pertains to many preventable future costs. How so? 
Adopting the model of mediation as ‘quality improvement’ evokes the simple 
analogy of ‘satisfaction with process’ as ‘customer satisfaction with service.’ An 
analogy34 to the realm of manufacturing, where the Total Quality Management 
(TQM) movement began, is to view “a mediation with satisfied parties” as a 
‘defect free product’. In TQM, the adage, ‘right the first time’, captures the idea 
that eliminating defects eliminates rework, which eliminates preventable costs. 
The analogy to the ADR arena is resolving a dispute properly, that is getting it 
‘right the first time’, implies fewer return visits to the court. TQM practitioners 
demonstrated through countless cases that eliminating rework not only improved 
quality, but saved costs as well. This was a mantra of the widely endorsed Quality 
is Free program of Phil Crosby.35 These approaches were translated into 
government in the 1990’s,36 as well as the legal profession,37 and the courts38, ,  
, , , , 
39
40 41 42 43 44. 
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What is the “rework”, that is, the preventable future costs in the courts? It comes 
in many forms. The list includes for example, lack of compliance with 
agreements, and other shortfalls that require more appearances before a judge.  In 
general, these are often failures to address underlying relational problems that 
lead to reentry into the courts, or other state or community supported systems at a 
later time.  
Assume that ADR interventions generally focus on addressing the underlying 
relationship between the parties. For cases appropriate for ADR, ADR tends to 
address the underlying relationship better than litigation almost every time. 
Evidence is good that parties to mediation are almost always more satisfied with 
the process. They also gain some capacity for dealing with their underlying 
difficulties – at the very least to know that they have an alternative to continuing 
conflict and entering litigation. Further, presume a common sense linkage of 
“satisfaction” as a strong indicator of eliminating revisits into the court and that 
this presumption is supported by some solid data. The question is whether there is 
a cost to this improved quality? 
The majority of evidence in this regard is that litigants experience cost savings, 
often large cost savings in comparison to similar cases that engage litigation – 
often on the order of 30%. For example, a study of mediation in general civil 
cases reported that half of the mediations reduced client cost an average of $6,000 
with estimates for those which increased cost at an average of $1,000.45 Larger 
percentage savings are experienced in the larger cases. For example, an analysis 
of 828 Civil Cases demonstrated an average cost of ADR of $870 for 19 hours of 
work in contrast to average litigation costs of $10,700, for 89 hours of work.46
Is there an increased cost of quality engendered by the courts? Based on the 
discussion in Model 3 we cannot say for sure. However, there is definitely not a 
strong compelling body of evidence that ADR taken as an overall portfolio, costs 
significantly more than litigation. Furthermore, other reviewers in the field, who 
conclude that there is no discernable effect on cost to the court, actually support 
the notion that there is no cost of quality. 
Discussion 
Counterpoint - In the parlance of TQM, the first task is improving control of variance, 
and then adjusting performance to a target objective.47 A caveat here is that the court 
administration must set directives and build up a number of managerial subsystems which 
span human resource management, incentive structures, information systems with timely 
performance feedback, data collection, evaluation, research, training programs, and esprit 
de corps in order to exercise control on its performance. Where is the overall court 
system in this regard?48
Counterpoint - TQM has a high failure rate in the non-manufacturing domains. Failed 
TQM programs go largely unpublished as this is not something people like to admit about 
their own attempts, and it is not a popular situation to study in academia. So does this 
make Model 4 inappropriate? As TQM was diffused into the non-manufacturing domains 
of industry, the service sector, healthcare, NGOs, and government, it had to be re-
envisioned and reinvented. Is anyone engaged in such a discourse regarding TQM in 
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ADR? Yes. For example, NACFM has an ongoing program promoting TQM in 
community mediation.49  
Counterpoint - There are unintended consequences of TQM. For example, if 
improvements in productivity outpace increase in demand then there is overcapacity and 
fewer workers are needed. Organizations must often support innovation to expand into 
new domains in order to reuse the capacity they invested in. If they do not, they usually 
end up cutting staff levels. Then workers associate TQM with headcount reduction and 
the next wave of TQM is unsupported. Are there such unintended consequences resulting 
from the growth of ADR and the seemingly high achievement of improved satisfaction 
(quality)? There is such discourse. For example, a 2004 study in California included an 
investigation as to whether the success of ADR encouraged early retirement of Judges 
who went into private ADR practice. They found no supportive evidence for this 
contention but kept open the concern. Another unanticipated dynamic may be that since 
the number of attorney billable hours is significantly reduced, attorneys may be earning 
less in using mediation, and consequently, they could become disinclined towards ADR. 
The Collaborative Law movement stands in stark contrast to this concern, but it may be a 
dynamic nevertheless. A third such unintended consequence, mentioned during 
interviews, is that in areas where ADR is affecting a decrease in the workload of judges, 
or even just perceived as such, there are judges who quietly decline to bring attention to 
this effect. Note here the work of Galanter on “The Vanishing Trial.”50 A fourth effect, 
also mentioned during interviews, is that while judges’ time is likely to be freed up to 
attend to cases which are not appropriate for ADR, they may be missing the cases that are 
of intellectual interest to them. This at least creates uncertainty of the mixed effect of 
ADR on their work. Yet another phenomenon derives from misperception -- another 
interview included a scenario that some clerks believe that the court-connected mediation 
services are directly funded by the court. In the face of unfilled vacancies among court 
personnel and budgetary pressures on local courts, or even headcount reduction within 
the court, this creates resentment towards ADR providers and the service. 
Counterpoint – What about liquidity? Conversion of efficiencies engendered by the use 
of ADR is more likely to be seen in productivity improvement or curtailing future growth 
in personnel rather than bottom-line cost savings.51
Counterpoint – What about the studies which indicate increased costs and decreased 
quality? These studies, which are considered outliers by many, nonetheless warrant 
serious consideration especially as they pertain to equal access to justice, the prospective 
emergence of a two-tiered system of justice, ethnic and cultural bias, power imbalances, 
inappropriately referred cases, and application of mediation in realms for which it is not 
well suited. Instead of wishing them away because of their comparatively small number, 
they probably ought to be the focus of the next wave of research – as that would seem to 
be the source of discoveries, critical to the field. These may warrant serious inquiry. 
While TQM has been implemented in the courts over the past decade, and there is 
continued deployment specific to ADR, as promoted for example by NACFM, courts 
have gone beyond TQM to adopt new managerial models such as strategic planning, data 
mining, and futures studies.52  
MA Office of Dispute Resolution, Working Paper, January 2006. Version 6.doc   16
Simplified Model 5: ADR Services Viewed as means of 
Reducing Lifespan of Case  
Introduction 
The data on cycle time reduction for ADR integrated with court management systems is 
generally compelling, indicating the potential for substantial reductions in both the 
calendar time and the lifespan of a case pending before the court. Some studies indicate, 
for certain situations, that cycle time to conduct mediation can sometimes take longer. 
This increase is shouldered largely by the ADR service and to a much less extent by the 
court. So too, the widespread endorsement of the ADR approach by the business 
community53 often underlines their preferred use of ADR in the interests of reducing time 
to resolution, to get back to business, and reduce unproductive time in courts. This is 
especially of concern to small businesses. Reluctance to engage in ADR on the basis of 
expected cycle time is associated with a lack of familiarity with the process, and a desire 
for finality, which is based on their confidence in, and appeal to the authority of a judge.   
Model 
Many studies indicate cycle time reduction of months, some just a matter of days. 
Very few studies indicate significant increases in time, and several suggest little 
difference. While the raw research can seem confusing, reviewers of the field 
generally agree that time savings are enjoyed when ADR is integrated with court 
management systems. Of special note is the endorsement of this finding by 
reviewers who question the overall value of ADR. 
It is interesting to note that with respect to expectations regarding the duration of 
a case, many businesses seek ADR for the same reason others avoid it and litigate. 
That is, their belief in the certainty of a rapid resolution. 
It is notable that some studies indicate that more money is transacted in ADR 
handled cases versus litigation. It is also noteworthy that in civil cases, as the 
amount in dispute increases, there tends to be a greater percentage cycle time 
savings and increased percentage of cost savings to the litigants from ADR. 
A Tabulation of Reported Effects on Disposition Time 
(This table, drawn from the annotated bibliography, is roughly sorted from reports of 
worse performance, to indiscernible effects, to strong support that ADR saves time.) 
Bahr 1987 Attorneys believed mediation increased time 
Crime Justice 1992 Time to complete the process; the potential cases required an average  
of 17 days to complete court processing with a range of 31 to 259 days. For 
actual cases, the average length of time from referral to completion of 
mediation was 18.6 days with a range of 1 to 50 days. 
Hanson 1997 The median number of days to settlement for mediated cases was 146; for  
non-mediated cases it was 109 (for settled cases only). For non-settled cases 
mediation adds time to some cases that finish quickly, but has no overall 
effect on the pace of settlement. 
Clarke  1992 Disposition time increased in 2 of 3 counties, staying the same in the 3rd. 
Kakalik 1996 There was no difference in time to disposition between mediation and non-
mediation groups in PA, OK, and NY, and significantly slower in mediation 
in TX 
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Keilitz 1988-90 Regarding case processing time, the evaluators found the pace of litigation 
was faster for mediated cases in some courts and slower for mediated cases 
in others. The evaluators point out that many things affect case processing 
time which are unrelated to the mediation program.  
Stienstra  46% of the attorneys involved in the program reported that it decreased 
disposition time. Forty-one percent felt the program had no effect on 
disposition time. 
Kobbervig 1991 No difference in time to disposition was found 
Eavenson 1998 No significant change in time to disposition in Gwinnett County, a 57 day 
drop in disposition time in Cobb County during first 6 months of program. 
Long-term effect not significant (0.6 month drop in second 6 months).  
Georgia Dis Res 2000 Participants did not feel that they spent less time litigating their case if they  
went to mediation 
Nasworthy 2000 Lawyers believed they worked the same amount of time as for a trial, but 
other interviewees said mediation would save courts money (attorneys are 
paid by the court). 
Stienstra 1994 61% of the attorneys reported that ADR reduced the time to disposition. 
Only 24 attorneys reported that ADR added to the disposition time of their 
case. 
Wissler 1997 Parties thought they were saving time; attorneys thought processing time was 
greater.  
Wissler 1999 There was little sense by parties that mediation reduced time involvement 
(23%). Attorneys thought it reduced time (about 66%)  
Donnelly 2000 No difference found between mediated and non-med cases. 76% Attorneys 
found meditation reduced time spent on case 
Gomez 1998 The programs did not appear to affect the time to disposition or the number 
of pre-trial hearings or motions. They did appear to reduce the number of 
pre-trial conferences 
Keilitz 1992 Mediation did not reduce the number of hearings held. Time to disposition 
was faster for mediated cases in 3 of 4 courts.  
Bridenback 1979 The average time from case referral to disposition was 11 days; the median 
time was 8 days. For three of the neighborhood justice centers studied, the 
time from a referral to a mediation hearing was 10 days. The time to 
disposition without a mediation hearing was 11 days. For cases that failed to 
achieve a resolution, the time was 14 days. Case processing in traditional 
court took longer.  
Cook 1980 Time to disposition was significantly lower for cases that were mediated 
than for those that were not.  
Emery 1982-87 Evaluators found settlements are reached more quickly in mediation 
Hartwell 1988 Attorneys believed that mediation saved their and their clients' time  
Schultz 1990 Processing time decreased (but looked at mediation cases from time of 
referral, not from filing).  
Goerdt 1992 The author estimated that each case settled saved 30-45 minutes of judge 
time 
Schildt 1994 Participants who settled their cases in mediation overwhelmingly believed 
mediation was a  quicker alternative to litigation  
Macfarlane 1995 Lawyers and parties thought processing time was shorter for mediated cases, 
a perception that was affirmed through court records.  
McAdoo 1997 46.7% said it saved attorney time 
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Hann 2001 For each case type, a higher percentage of Rule 24.1 cases were disposed of 
within 6 months than for cases in the control group (in which cases were  
managed but only a few were mediated). Time to disposition appeared to be 
quicker after Rule 24.1. 
Wissler 2002 Early referral led to shorter time to disposition – for both cases that settled 
and those that did not. Parties were more likely to believe time and money 
were saved if the case settled in mediation. 
Eaglin 1990 Unsettled mediated cases took an average of 12 days longer to move from 
docketing to submission than non-mediated cases, but taken as a group all 
cases assigned to mediation took an average of 25 fewer days from filing to 
disposition 
Clarke 1995 Processing time decreased 7 weeks w/ mediation 
Emery 1989 Time to settlement was three weeks in mediation and seven weeks in 
adversarial settlement. 
Fairbanks 2001 The median number of days in James City County in disposition time for 
mediated cases was 48 days; in York County the median was 92 days.  
Hanson 1991 Case processing time, the mediated cases were faster with a 110 day median 
versus 178 days for the control group. In addition, the appeals of settlements 
were not much longer than appeals of non-conference settlements. For the  
75th percentile, the medians were 187 days (mediated) versus 178 days 
(control). 
Zuberbuhler 1999 No significant difference was found in time to disposition; mediated cases on 
average were disposed of 2 months faster than those undergoing custody 
evaluations (which included 5.3% of the control group).  
Judicial  
Council of CA 
1996 The pace of litigation, the average time from filing to mediation was 343 
days. In San Diego, the time was 257 days; in Los Angeles, the average time 
was 385 days. The researchers also found that the number of days from filing 
to mediation was longer for successful mediation (298 days) than for failed 
mediation (262 days).  
Lowe 1992 The program improved the pace of litigation. The median time for the 
experimental group was 314 days while the median time for the control 
group was 346 days, from filing to disposition.  
Slack 1996 Prior to the mediation program, time to disposition ranged from 37 to 1434 
days, with a mean of 367.47. After the mediation program commenced, time 
to disposition ranged from 44 to 974 days, with a mean of 338.73. 
Hanson 2000 Prior to the introduction of mediation the average number of days to the 
grant or denial of appeal was 448, with another 202 days to opinion. 
Mediation took 60 days to move from the filing of the petition for review to 
mediation (some took up to 120 days). 
Mandell 2002 Time to resolution, 13% of cases in the treatment were resolved within 3 
months (the deadline for mediation), as compared to 9% of cases in the 
control group. Approximately 25% of cases in the treatment group were 
resolved within 4 months (the deadline for discovery), as opposed to 12% of 
control group cases. All other date-delimited percentages were the same. 
Thus, the main impact of mediation on time to disposition came within the 
first months of the life of the case. 
McEwan 1991 Successfully mediated cases had shorter disposition time compared with the 
control group; however, for cases that did not settle, the disposition time was 
longer. The average time to disposition for the experimental group as a 
whole was about 60 days shorter than for the control group.  
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Pearson 1991 The evaluators found that successfully mediated cases had time savings. 
Cases that mediated successfully took 8.5 months. Cases that litigated took 
10.5 months. Cases that mediated unsuccessfully and therefore needed both 
mediation and litigation took 14.2 months.  
Pearson 1984 Time from the initiation of the proceeding to the final order in successfully 
mediated cases was 9.7 months on average, 11.9 months on average for the 
control group, 11.1 months for those who were referred but rejected 
mediation, and 13.4 months for cases that were unsuccessfully mediated. 
Snapp 1997 Strong statistical and practical support for proposition that ADR saves time. 
ADR brought case terminations at 28% faster rate than traditional litigation - 
often without the need for discovery. 
 
Discussion 
What is the value of reduced cycle time to the court? This is likely to be specific to the 
court system in question and the objectives of court administration, scheduling, and the 
case management system need. 
Is there a cost to cycle time and calendar time reduction? Most studies in the ADR 
research base suggest a correlation with cost savings. In industry, it is widely believed 
that improving quality tends to decrease cost and decreasing cycle time reduction tends to 
improve quality as well as reduce cost. 
Counterpoint: Some studies suggest that ADR is viewed by some as a mechanism for the 
court to dispose of cases faster, which they see as inappropriate. As for example in family 
matters where speed is not always in the interest of the children, the parents, or the need 
of the court for detailed investigation. There are also reports that some parties to an ADR 
process feel unduly pressured to settle more quickly than the parties anticipate. Similarly, 
settlement rates, which have become a de facto standard of the success of ADR, is 
viewed by many as placing the goal of case processing efficiency above the interests of 
the parties. These all warrant consideration. They further support the notion that more 
than one metric or narrow model needs to be considered. 
To the extent that the budget decision-maker believes that ADR will be well integrated in 
the emerging court management systems and that an objective for court performance is 
improved disposition time, the evidence supports an affirmative decision. There is not a 
substantial evidence base which demonstrates a high risk of not achieving improvement 
in disposition time when ADR is integrated with court management. However, the variety 
in the reported data, lack of recent Massachusetts data, and early stage of the new court 
management regime implies a high degree of uncertainty in projecting actual potential 
time savings. So, in the context of a directive to integrate ADR with the court 
management systems there is a low downside risk of failure, but a very high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the level of upside success.  
What about studies regarding unintended consequences with respect to disposition? One 
RAND study in the handling of automotive cases in New Jersey presents a cautionary 
note.54 But note that this was in the realm of arbitration outside the typical practice of 
community mediation centers. 
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Simplified Model 6: ADR Services Viewed as a Risk 
Management Vehicle 
Introduction 
Investment in community ADR could be viewed as an approach to risk management. The 
basic idea is that ADR interventions preclude bigger problems later. More specifically, 
investment ADR interventions are paid back by avoiding the large cost of a 
comparatively small number of events at a later time. Previous models constrained the 
scope of inquiry to the court and metrics that pertained primarily to performance of the 
court. In this model the scope of interest is the total cost to the state across all services, 
and for longer time horizons than disposition time of particular cases. 
Model 
Consider the following examples. 
 Juvenile / Neighborhood Criminal Cases: Interventions including mediation 
with a juvenile criminal, who is causing trouble in a neighborhood, can be 
viewed as a mechanism of risk management with respect to the correctional 
system.  Suppose that of the several dozen such cases engaged by a 
community center over a two year period that one is ascertained to have kept 
the juvenile out of the juvenile detention system. The estimated savings solely 
from avoiding the cost of detention for one year is $30,000+. 
 Permanency Mediation Cases – similarly, consider the cost savings to 
avoiding a contested court case involving foster care. In Massachusetts an 
estimated savings from precluding this type of event is conservatively 
estimated at $6,000. Let us suppose three such events are prevented by said 
center every two years. 
Average Cost per mediation    $3,000 
Projected Cost of Court Case (1 week)  $8,860 
Court Case Reimbursement rates   $1,772/day 
Judge    $421 
Clerk Magistrate  $331 
Session Clerk   $143 
Court Officer  $174 
Probation Officer $189 
DSS Social Worker $138 
DSS Attorney  $179 
CPCS Attorney $195 
Plus costs for stenographers and expert witnesses, 
Plus continued foster care placement during litigation. 
This is a conservative underestimate as cases often run longer.55
 Permanency Mediation Cases – suppose that one success is achieved by said 
center every two years that avoids a single year of foster care placement – 
saving $20,000+ per annum. 
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Note that the average Massachusetts state funding per funded center is $40K per 
year. The above set of precluded events would pay back the entire contribution of 
the state to that center. 
 
Discussion 
Consider yet another type of event, reviewed in a Ph.D. dissertation at John Hopkins. In a 
program in Maryland, after several calls to police for domestic violence at the same 
address, the police make a referral to mediation themselves with documented savings.56, 
, 57 58
Risk management approaches have evolved in domains of practice concerned with safety. 
A risk management framework may be applicable in the role of mediation in violence 
prevention as it pertains to safety. This is an emerging perspective of public health 
research in addressing violence. An example of the transference of risk management 
approaches between domains is seen in the adoption of methods of the National 
Transportation Safety Board in the Patient Safety arena. The use of mediation as a 
mechanism of risk management can be seen as part of a broad shift in risk management 
services provided to families.59  
Simplified Model 7: ADR Services Viewed as Leveraged 
Funding Portfolios 
Introduction 
Perhaps the most compelling, solid, indisputable, current data, specific to Massachusetts, 
is the diversified portfolios of funding assembled by the community mediation centers. 
Several examples from the past year illustrate the portion of the state contribution to these 
centers.  
Model 
As a benchmark, note that the current average funding per center of $40K is less 
than 75% of the average operating budgets of community mediation centers 
nationwide.60 Massachusetts reflects the nation in the leveraging effect – the other 
75% of the funds is raised by the community mediation centers themselves. 
Consider the following example centers for FY05 funding: 
Center 1 State contribution was 25% of total program funding 
Center 2 State contribution was 23%% of total program funding 
Center 3 State contribution was 12.5% of total program funding 
Center 4 State contribution was 15% of total program funding 
Center 5 State contribution was   8% of total program funding. 
How has the state contribution and overall portfolios changed over time? 
Center 1 grew their funding over 110% over the past decade with the state 
contribution floating between 25-30% of total funding. 
Center 2 grew their funding portfolio by 50% over the last five years – with only a 
minor increase in state support. 
Center 3 has grown their portfolio almost tenfold over the past fourteen years with 
the state’s contribution declining as a percentage of total revenue. 
MA Office of Dispute Resolution, Working Paper, January 2006. Version 6.doc   22
Center 4’s revenue has declined about 10% over the last several years reflecting a 
sudden 25% decline in the state’s contribution followed by fairly steady funding 
at the lower level. 
Center 5 grew revenue by 12% over the past five years while the state 
contribution declined 28%. 
Many believe that the state investment in a community mediation center is an 
important signal for other funders such as foundations, and corporations. It is 
taken as a mark of legitimacy, which is stronger than certification. Furthermore, 
many foundations will not fund infrastructure as the earmark does. 
A strong argument can be made that the state, by providing at least some funding, 
leverages its investment. 
Discussion 
The state’s contribution is leveraged several-fold by additional contributions assembled 
by the community centers in the service of the public. It is believed by several 
interviewees, and some literature, that by sending a signal of legitimacy and value, the 
state is in part responsible for assisting the community centers in this additional fund-
raising. From this perspective, for the sample of community centers above, the state 
contribution leverages 300% to 1250% of additional funding. 
It may also be appropriate in the portfolio model to include the donation of ‘in-kind 
services.’ In Model 1, the role of volunteer mediation was viewed “as if” it were a 
contracted service. Pro bono mediation provided by volunteers is more appropriately 
considered from the standpoint of leveraged resources. The state investment in 
infrastructure can be viewed as leveraging the contribution of volunteer resources. For 
example, the state contributed roughly $180K to Center 5 from 2000-2005. During that 
period, Center 5 handled over 10,000 ADR transactions.  
 Community & Court mediation referral                                          2,347 
 Community & Court mediations                                               1,279 
 School mediation referrals                                                            1,393  
 School mediations                                                                               602 
 Participants in facilitations                                                              1,546 
 Participants in communication skill and mediation trainings             1,029 
 Participants in school trainings                                                       1,305 youths  
   832 adults 
While the work of community centers in school mediation is partially funded by the 
Department of Justice, the infrastructure funded by the earmark also serves volunteers in 
the school setting. This spill-over effect is viewed as critical by community center 
directors.  
Across the state there are perhaps over 2,000 trained mediators, with roughly 500 
attached to the community centers receiving state funding via earmark. Massachusetts 
centers reflect national volunteer resources in the leveraged portfolio such centers. 
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By its inconsistency in annual budget allocation, the state is sending a mixed signal to the 
other funders who support the centers’ service to the state. When, by lack of 
infrastructure funding, a center becomes insolvent, the state in essence either loses the 
relational infrastructure of the volunteer resources or transfers the burden of transition to 
the volunteers themselves. 
Simplified Model 8: ADR Services Viewed as 
Investments in Social Capital 
Introduction 
This model views the partnership of court and community mediation centers as a network 
for building healthy safe communities in furtherance of statewide initiatives such as 
Massachusetts Partnership for Healthy Communities (MPHC).  The purpose of MPHC 
overlaps and intersects with activities of the community mediation programs.  At the 
community level, community mediation centers prevent family violence, integrate 
community policing with neighborhood leadership, organize resources with mental health 
services, coordinate elderly services, prevent homelessness, and repair business 
relationships. 
Model:  
The community mediation programs can frame their supportive purpose as: 
Practitioners of Alternative Dispute Resolution deliver mediation services which 
strengthen communities throughout Massachusetts. Community Mediation helps 
build healthy communities by its focus on strengthening the relationships that 
make up a community - within the family, between neighbors, between businesses 
and their customers, and between agencies and the citizens they serve.  By 
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declaring the intent to partner with the Massachusetts Partnership for Healthy 
Communities community mediation centers acknowledge their longstanding 
involvement towards the intent of the MPHC initiative and declare their joint 
intent in leveraging community mediation activities, especially in support of 
community action programs. 62 Community Mediation Programs are at the heart 
of building strong vibrant communities. Mediators engage communities through a 
spectrum of interventions: 
- In schools  
o Delivering peer mediation training for preventing youth violence 
o Ensuring alignment of services with children’s needs 
o Assisting children with life transitions 
- With the Family 
o Preventing violence, and protecting the interests of children, the 
parties, and the neighborhood during difficult transitions such as 
divorce, placement of children, and providing restorative justice after 
family violence. 
o Facilitating positive outcomes in the joint interests of family, 
neighborhoods, and victims involved with juvenile behavior. 
- In the neighborhood 
o Ensuring equitable situations regarding housing and the prevention of 
homelessness. 
o Resolving conflicts over property rights and gaining agreements on 
land use issues. 
- In business 
o Supporting productive local markets through resolution of 
disagreements in business transactions. 
- For education and academia 
o Providing training opportunities through internships for students of 
mediation programs and law schools. 
o Directly training and delivering continuing education for volunteer 
mediators in the community, building community capacity, and 
steadily transforming the culture. 
Therefore, state contribution to community mediation centers could be viewed as 
investments in social capital and expanding the Commonwealth’s investment in 
the Massachusetts Partnership for Healthy Communities. State funding could be 
appropriated for community mediation centers through the MPHC initiative as 
well as through the Trial Court.  
The emergence of court and community collaboration also serves as models of 
social capital building. For example, the Worcester Housing Court makes referrals 
to homeless prevention programs to assist tenants at risk of eviction. Similarly, 
the District and Probate Courts make referrals to community mediation programs. 
Beyond resolving a dispute, the mediation process often connects parties to a 
network of support services. Community mediation centers are a locus of 
interagency coordination. Partnerships of the court with community programs and 
working through the community programs are methods for community-building. 
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Court and community collaboration is in evidence across the country in the 
community justice movement63, community/neighborhood courts, problem-
solving courts, restorative justice, preventative justice, therapeutic jurisprudence. 
The community justice movement is seen by its practitioners as a mechanism of 
public safety.64
Discussion:  
The growth in use of ADR and mediation, as part of an extended service of the court, can 
be seen as part of a long cycle in the balance of the justice system with systems of 
equity.65, 66 The fulcrum of this pendulum is in the connection between state and 
municipal legal systems with social systems embedded in the community, especially 
community mediation centers. Early in the twentieth century, Mary Parker Follet67, a 
scholarly practitioner in community development and mediation in the Boston area, 
characterized this dynamic as “a kind of balance theory” concerning individuality versus 
society’s interests.68 She considered the “balance theory” which seemed to underlie 
partisan politics at the state level a “monstrous fallacy” since these forces must be 
brought into synchrony at the neighborhood level. The Neighborhood Justice Centers 
project government justice reform program, of the mid-1970s, sought to restore 
neighborhoods as the locus of the system of equity. A review by the Department of 
Justice suggests the role of the courts in this regard resulted from the waning influence of 
the traditional social institutions of family, church, and informal community leadership.69
Aligning the purpose of the state budget on court-connected community mediation 
programs with an overarching strategy for community-building makes a lot of sense. 
Community mediation programs can easily engage as partners in these types of initiatives 
throughout the Commonwealth. To the extent that some are already engaged in this 
partnership, why not raise the visibility of their involvement? Is there a broader statewide 
initiative which matches so many service areas already engaged by the community 
mediation programs? Is there greater momentum behind any statewide program that 
could be leveraged in so many areas as that for Healthy Communities? By engaging this 
as a strategic directive, community mediation centers frame the value for which they 
provide such unique and critical competencies: in building social capital by focusing on 
strengthening communities – one relationship at a time.  
Summary and Analysis of Models for Evaluating ADR 
Return on Investment 
The first four models outlined above address cost. As over-simplifications:  
• Model 1 addresses cost control via the model of a contract;  
• Model 2 considers the classic ‘internalize versus outsource’ decision; 
• Model 3 addresses ADR as a cost reduction strategy. 
• Model 4 asks “Is there a cost of quality in ADR?” Quality drives cost reduction. 
The analysis in Model 1 surfaced the mechanism of controlling the risk of cost overrun 
for services built into the current funding and service delivery arrangement. It concludes 
there is an arrangement favorable to the state. The risk is underutilization which is 
primarily under the control and influence of the courts.  
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Model 2 drew out the need to evaluate funding in comparison to some alternative. That 
comparison considered the extreme cases of not funding external services at all – either 
by internalizing it or returning completely to litigation. Model 2 indicates the feasibility 
of internalizing ADR services but illustrates that it would require a major upheaval in the 
approach to budgeting of both the courts and the community centers. Such a 
consideration ought to consider the total system.  
Model 3 suggests that people involved in this budget decision-making process ought to 
adjust the “hurdle” rate expected of the investment to be in line with other low risk 
investments.  
Model 4 acknowledged that ADR improves the quality of court services. This is well 
documented and enjoys a very broad consensus. It also notes that since there is no 
compelling body of evidence that ADR costs more than litigation, there is no ‘cost of 
quality’. Model 4 draws on the good evidence base regarding “satisfaction with process” 
as another, powerful means of demonstrating the low risk of investment in ADR. It also 
points out how the improvement of quality can be seen as a driver of cost reduction.  
Model 4 makes the bridge to consideration of process life cycle, closely associated with 
the concern of cycle time reduction in Model 5. 
In considering a budget allocation as an investment, it is appropriate to consider other 
investment options which have comparable risk profiles with a solid data record 
regarding its volatility and return on investment over time – that is, the financial markets. 
Interestingly enough, this is not very complicated at a first level of analysis. A proxy 
approach is to consider simply the distribution of the number of studies that report returns 
on ADR investment at various levels. Look at the variation of the data on ADR and 
match it to a general class of financial instrument. After review of a large number of such 
studies, ADR would seem to appeal to a risk adverse investor. This implies that a 
reasonable “hurdle” rate to expect, as a return on investment in ADR, ought to be in line 
with the comparable returns from a class of financial instruments with a similar risk 
profile. That is just 4-6%.  
Why then would anyone consider a 10%-20% cost savings to not be an attractive return 
on investment. A 10%-20% cost savings is two to five times the expected rate of return 
for an alternative investment with similar risk. Perhaps, as was suggested by a participant 
in the workshop, “because they just never thought about it that way.” Whatever the 
reason, this point warrants consideration, particularly by budget analysts.  
Model 3 points out that while the research on the impact of ADR on court costs can seem 
complicated, confusing, and inconclusive, one can derive valuable insight regarding the 
overall distribution of reported cost impacts and interpret that as volatility. While there is 
great variation, the distribution is not unusual at all. Cost studies within organizations for 
their portfolio of projects of a common type typically indicate a “bunching” of costs 
savings near the low end. There are typically a small percentage of projects that have 
negative returns. There are also typically a set of projects which enjoy cost savings. The 
number of projects which perform in a stellar fashion are comparatively low in number.70
ADR seems less volatile than financial markets that can go into a downswing. There is no 
comparable evidence of the “downswing” phenomenon in the ADR field that would 
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cause widespread devaluation of the ADR investment. The beauty of the ADR 
investment is that the returns are comparatively incremental and steady. The returns may 
sometimes not play out on a case-by-case basis, or in certain situations, or in court 
administrations that do not integrate ADR with case management systems and 
scheduling. Yet, the majority of studies indicate positive returns on investment in terms 
of cost savings. There is good consensus in the research community on positive returns 
when ADR is deployed in conjunction with strong court administration, integrated with 
case management systems. 
Still, there is no solid consensus in the research community that, in the absence of 
integrated case management, ADR will still provide cost savings to a court. Bibliometrics 
on the topic indicate that it is an active area of debate. Would it then be useful for the 
purpose of budget justification to try to discern the data on impact on court costs? 
Probably not. Researchers, at the RAND Corporation, supported by economists, 
statisticians, analysts, and a budget several-fold larger than the Massachusetts annual 
state budget for community mediation centers, pursued this question and the results were 
considered inconclusive by reviewers. Trying to draw a different conclusion ourselves 
would likely be similarly inconclusive and, in the worst case, lead to “paralysis by 
analysis.” 
The more important finding is that most all the studies focus on a few metrics with which 
to assess judicial and court staff time to measure cost savings. Few studies address the 
effect of ADR on costs to other state and municipal agencies that are often involved in 
cases appropriate for ADR. No study considers the use of ADR in the courts with respect 
to all the cost reductions to business relationships (and hence taxes), police, social 
services, the penal system, healthcare, mental health services, and the schools. One must 
ask of course, where is it appropriate to draw the boundaries of analysis with respect to 
organizations and time? 
Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 illustrate broader consideration of the return on investment than is 
typically captured within the narrow scope of inquiry of most research studies.  
 Model 5 Cycle Time, through tabulation of summary findings on disposition time, 
illustrates the variety of answers provided by research given different definitions 
of what is being measured.  
 Model 6 presents the actuarial stance, apropos to risk management. The strength 
of the presentation is that comparatively few downstream events are required to 
payback investment in ADR. The weakness is that there are few longitudinal 
studies which provide an evidence base. 
 Model 7 (Leveraging) points out that the state is already engaged in a public-
private partnership enabled by the diversified funding portfolios of the community 
centers. In contrast to most of the research studies cited in the report, this data is 
based on hard numbers, specific to the programs, and are current with good trend 
data. This does not require any significant additional research. 
 Model 8 presents the investment in ADR as an investment which complements 
the state’s strategic agenda for strengthening communities. 
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 Recommendations on Investment Based on Different Models  
and with Respect to Different Policy Objectives 
 Yes No Comment 
Model 1 Outsourcing 3  A contract with no downside risk 
Model 2 Internalize vs. 
Outsource 
  Don’t know, there are great examples but 
internalizing would require a switch to 
long range budget planning 
Model 3 Court Costs  3 
* 
A risk adverse investor would say there is 
too much uncertainty, even though there 
might not be much actual financial risk. 
Model 4 Quality  3 
*  
** 
 Strongest, most consistent data on 
satisfaction supports an affirmative vote 
on this measure under any policy. 
Model 5 Cycle Time 3 
* 
3 
** 
Evidence base is generally supportive but 
it is not clear a focus on cycle time is in 
the interest of society. 
Model 6 Risk Management 3 
** 
 Its believable, makes common sense, this 
is where the really compelling stories are 
from. But this type of analysis requires 
longitudinal studies over a lifetime. A yes 
vote seems to just make sense, but it 
would only be supported anecdotally 
rather than by a strong evidence base. 
Model 7 Leveraging 3 
* 
** 
3 
* 
This is hard data, current, and most 
specific to the programs. But this thinking 
about the good of the whole community 
may be too broad if a decision maker is 
focused on court efficiency alone.  
Model 8 Social Capital 3 
** 
3 
* 
Excellent endeavor that can be launched 
regardless of the funding decision. 
 
Under a Policy Objective Focused on Court Efficiency 
* Given the softness of the data, if the policy objective were to focus primarily on 
improving court efficiency, and the state had a choice of investment vehicles towards that 
end, then investing the money in the strategic level actions recommended in the Monan 
Report would be a priority. This would include such things as an integrated case 
management system, reorganization, data collection, training for court personnel. Even if 
court-connected ADR has a stellar effect on the court efficiency, one would never be able 
to confirm it because the court systems are unable to track its performance. Investment 
based on the models taken individually is recommended based on Models 1, 4, and 7. 
Investment advice from Models 2, 3, and 5 are not supported by a strong evidence base 
with respect to implementing an efficiency policy. Model 3 is however, an implicit 
presumption in implementing ADR. It is not clear that Models 6 and 8 are directly 
supportive of an efficiency policy.  
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Under a Policy Objective Focused on Service to the Community 
** If on the other hand the policy objective were to provide benefit for the state, 
especially local  communities, then these models suggest investment advice would be to 
fund it.  Models 7 and 8 are the most compelling in this regard. Model 7 has hard data 
and Model 8 great stories but no firm evidence base. Model 4 seems to be a strong 
supporter of this directive as well. It is not clear that Model 5 supports overall societal 
goals – this is a current topic of debate. It is not clear if Model’s 1, 2, or 3 are directly 
supportive of an directive for overall benefit to the state. 
 
A range of similar policy objectives needs to be developed and one policy objective 
selected. Then the financial models for ADR can be evaluated within a performance 
context along the lines above. 
 
 
Budget Justification  
with Respect to Policy Directive 
                  Policy Directive 
Model 
Court 
Performance 
Overall Benefit  
to State 
Supports Funding Decision 1, 4, 5, 7   4, 6, 7, 8 
Strong Evidence-Base 1, 4, 7 4, 7 
Don’t know if model 
supports directive 
6, 8 1, 2, 3 
• Model 1 Cost control via contract 
• Model 2 Internalize 
• Model 3 Cost reduction strategy
• Model 4 Cost of quality
• Model 5 Reducing case lifespan
• Model 6 Risk Management
• Model 7 Leverage portfolios
• Model 8 Building Social Capital.
 
Conclusion 
The primary value often derived from the above type of analysis is the surfacing of 
assumptions and identification of the need for clarity in direction setting. The use of 
multiple models is a means of generating a variety of perspectives towards that end. Care 
has been taken to illustrate where these models, taken as analogies, fit as well as fall 
short. The sensitivity of a yes/no decision based on particular models is to some extent 
illustrated with respect to the stance and belief of the decision maker and the 
administrative objectives of the court system. 
Several places in the narrative point out where performance objectives for the court 
system pertain to both the value of the model as well as whether one could draw a 
conclusion on a model. Performance and accountability in government suggest setting 
objectives and measuring results as a means of ensuring transparency in public funding. 
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The objectives serve the guiding and monitoring of implementation and the integration 
with court management systems. The “ostensible” case management and quality 
objectives for implementing ADR, identified by the Standing Committee in the 1998 
report,71 should probably be revisited with respect to priority setting.72
The Trial Court’s pamphlet “A Guide to Court-Connected Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Services” identifies the top four advantages of ADR73 as saving time and money, finality, 
compliance, and custom-made solutions. This appeal is no doubt based on the Homo 
economicus model of the rational, fully informed, economically self-interested person 
driven by extrinsic motivations. Yet, the advantage included in the guide, which is most 
directly pertinent to the building of social capital, appealing to the combined interest of 
the individual, the community they live in, the court, and the state which serves them is 
Preservation or Enhancement of Long-Term Relationships.74 Critical to the integrity, 
development, and resilience of families and their neighborhoods this objective is also 
especially pertinent to small claims involving businesses. Businesses well understand the 
adage that “it costs an order of magnitude more to get a new customer as to preserve a 
relationship with an existing customer.” The current Trial Court Standing Committee on 
Dispute Resolution should reflect on whether the belief system which underlies how they 
prioritize proposed benefits of ADR might be better served by combining this baseline 
with a Homo sociologicus75, 76 model, which accounts for the strong social influence on 
what parties to a dispute really want. That is their voice to be heard, someone to listen to 
their story - to address their and society’s interest in the fulfillment of social roles. The 
nature of such frame reflection is critical to policy setting in order to balance the Logic of 
Consequence with a Logic of Appropriateness. 
A combined framework would also better accommodate the dual need of community 
centers to appeal to the combined interest of prospective users of the ADR process, as 
well as better represent the intrinsic motivation and reflective craftsmanship of volunteer 
ADR practitioners – the greatest asset in the system of equity which balances the formal 
system of jurisprudence. 
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Suggestions for Future Work 
The following suggestions are offered to continue the work initiated in this Working 
Paper. MODR is interested in collaborating on the execution of these projects. Individual 
project proposals can be developed and funding sources identified to complement the 
annual appropriation.  
1. Setting Policy 
1.1. Clarify policy objectives and priorities in the context of the Uniform Rules on 
Dispute Resolution. Foster alignment of the Legislature, the CJAM, and the 
Standing Committee on common policy directives. 
1.2. Integrate ADR policy directives with the court management systems, data 
collection and evaluation. 
2. Implementing Court-Connected ADR 
2.1. Map the current geographic coverage of all court-connected mediation in the 
state. 
2.2. Launch a strategic planning process for the development of an Implementation 
Plan for Court Connected ADR System, integrated with court ADR policy. 
2.3. Conduct a needs assessment for the court and the legislature of the court-
connected programs to inform decision making in the FYO8 Budget Cycle. 
2.4. Develop a new Report to the Legislature on the Impact of ADR on the Court.  
2.5. Construct a projective cost-benefit analysis of ADR in the Courts. 
2.6. Install a data collection and evaluation system, drawing on existing ADR data 
collection standards77,78 to generate Massachusetts ADR performance data on an 
ongoing basis. This ought to be conducted in conjunction with related 
administrative activities launched in response to the Monan Report.  
2.7. Conduct “Future of Court-Connected ADR” event. 
3. Connecting Court and Community ADR to Broader Public Initiatives 
3.1. Forge a strong collaboration between mediation centers and the Massachusetts 
Partnership for Healthy Communities initiative. 
3.2. Select and implement innovative proven models from other states to advance 
court-community collaboration in new areas. 
3.3. Form a state association – Practitioner-Research network. 
4. Connecting Court and Community ADR to MODR’s Overall Research Agenda  
4.1. Commission the Trial Court Libraries to compile a special collection on ADR 
research starting with those reports in the annotated bibliography.  
4.2. Launch research network considering the role of ADR in Social Capital 
formation and community building. 
4.3. Engage the Campbell Collaboration of the American Institutes of Research in 
Systematic Research Synthesis of lifespan effects of mediation.  
4.4. Design and deploy a forecasting system for conflict prevention in communities 
leveraged by Geographic Information Systems for the purpose of supporting 
data-driven planning of future budgets. 
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Under The Civil Justice Reform Act (Vol. I, 51 Pp.); Implementation of The Civil Justice Reform Act In 
Pilot And Comparison Districts (Vol. II, 283 Pp.); An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under 
The Civil Justice Reform Act (Vol. III, 386 Pp.); And an Evaluation of Mediation and Early Neutral 
Evaluation under The Civil Justice Reform Act (Vol. IV, 492.) Rand ICJ 1996. 
23 For example, the Summer 1997 issue of Dispute Resolution Magazine includes ten articles responding to 
and critiquing elements of the RAND report. 
24 Deborah R. Hensler, ADR Research at the Crossroads, Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2000, No. 1, 
pp.71-78, 2000.  The 1996 RAND CJRA report received a critical response. Hensler considers the response 
a “dramatic manifestation of this shift… away from empirical investigation and critical analysis of ADR 
consequences”.  In addressing the question “What is the effect on litigation and court costs?” RAND 
Researcher Hensler formulated the nature of the debate as follows.  
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…it is indisputable that ADR has been ‘sold’ within the court context as a set of procedures for 
reducing judicial caseloads and cutting time to disposition. ADR proponents have therefore been 
disappointed by research suggesting that cost and time savings may be illusory. 
This is not because resolving a dispute short of adjudication is as costly as taking a case to trial. If 
parties can reach resolution through ADR, the public and private costs of litigation will almost 
certainly be less than the costs of full-blown trial. But in the court setting, ADR does not substitute 
for trial, but rather adds one or more procedures for facilitating settlement to the lawyer-driven 
negotiation process. 
The question is: Under what circumstances does ADR reduce cost and time to disposition, by 
comparison with old-fashioned negotiation? My reading of the available data suggests that when 
savings occur, it is because they are accompanied by other changes in case management, for 
example, imposing strict time guidelines where such did not exist (or, were not consistently 
implemented) previously, or limited discovery. 
Hensler concludes this section with the suggestion that “large institutional ‘repeat players’ are in a better 
position to provide data for research than courts.” We can go one step further and ask “do large institutional 
‘repeat players’ generally endorse the use of ADR? Surveys suggest this is a resounding ‘yes’, and studies 
indicate further expansion of its use. (Note as the contrary position is not a popular one it may be under-
reported.)  
“Why is there a perception that ADR saves time and money?” “Why does there seem to be a discrepancy 
between the perception and objective data?” Hensler suggests: 
One possibility is that we are missing something in our measures. Indeed there are few studies 
that have attempted to measure whether the use of ADR reduced parties’ time spent on litigation 
or has positive consequences…sometimes lumped into the ‘qualitative’ benefits of using ADR But 
they have real – and in principle, measurable – financial value. By ignoring them we may be 
underestimating savings associated with court ADR. 
Also noted is the absence of studies on the effect of ADR on time and resource allocation. Hensler 
concludes consideration of this question by suggesting the perceptions may simply be wrong on several 
accounts. “…individuals overestimate the likelihood of low-probability-high-negative consequence 
events…Since every lawsuit has a small probability of going to trial and since the costs of trial can be 
enormous, it would not be surprising for those costs to loom large in individual’s subjective calculus of 
savings associated with ADR.” She also suggests that via ‘stereotyping’ trials as expensive and time 
consuming “ADR practitioners themselves may enhance the likelihood that parties and their lawyers will 
compare the costs of their ADR experience with the costs of a statistically unlikely trial.” 
25 Deborah R. Hensler, Does ADR Really Save Money? The Jury’s Still Out, The National Law Journal, 
1994, reprint by RAND/RP327. 
26 Leo E. Strine, Jr., "Mediation Only" Filings in the Delaware Court Of Chancery: Can New Value Be 
Added by one of America's Business Courts?”, University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 03-17, February 26, 2003. Social Science Research Network Electronic 
Paper Collection: [http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=414483] 
27 Peter S. Hovmand, Effectiveness of court mandated referrals: A system dynamics model and simulation, 
The 129th Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association, Atlanta, GA, Oct 21-25, 2001. 
[http://apha.confex.com/apha/129am/techprogram/paper_28794.htm] 
28 Narrowing the Gap Between Research and Practice: Taking Nonlinear Dynamics into Account, The 
Eighth Annual Conference of The Society for Social Work and Research Symposium, 2004. 
[http://www.sswr.org/papers2004/490.htm] 
Social work has a long history of appreciating the importance of understanding complex systems, 
from individuals to large organizations. While social work has been theoretically oriented toward 
a systems perspective, most research methods have a limited ability to represent and evaluate 
nonlinear processes. Stressing empirically based practice while relying on methods that are 
essentially limited to linear cause-effect relationships can have the unintended effect of actually 
increasing the gap between social work research and practice. The goal of this symposium is to 
present research that represents and evaluates nonlinear dynamics. 
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29 From Kakalik 1996: “[RAND ICJ] found no strong statistical evidence that the mediation or neutral 
evaluation programs, as instituted in the six districts studied, significantly affected time to disposition, 
litigation costs, or attorney view of fairness or satisfaction with case management. The only significant 
outcome is that these ADR programs appear to increase the likelihood of a monetary settlement.” 
30 Also around 1996, a Federal Judicial Center (FJC) report to the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on 
Court Administration and Case Management documented significant savings in dispute resolution time and 
cost in federal district court programs. See Donna Stienstra, et al, Report to The Judicial Conference 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management: A Study of Five Demonstration Programs 
Established Under The Civil Justice Reform Act Of 1990 (Federal Judicial Ctr. 1997). 
31 Note that correlation is not as strong as ascertaining “causality.” 
32 J. Thibaut and R. Walker, Procedural Justice. New York: Wiley, 1975. These social psychologists are 
likely the most influential in the development of the measure of “satisfaction with process” widely 
employed in the mediation research community. 
33 Resource Materials of the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice, ABA, St. Paul, Minnesota, April, 1976. 
34 Dana Baggett, TQM Project Coordinator in Maine. 
A court is an organization that is filled with processes; therefore, TQM [which focuses on 
improving processes] has potential and application in the court environment.  
35 Philip B. Crosby, Quality is Free: The Art of Making Quality Certain, New American Library, New 
York, NY, 1979. 
36 Examples of the translation of the Total Quality Management movement into government, with examples 
in the courts is found in: (a) David K. Carr, and Ian D. Littman,, Excellence in Government: Total Quality 
Management in the 1990s, Coopers and Lybrand, Arlington, VA, 1990. (b) Regina Kay Brough, "Total 
Quality Management in State Government," Journal of State Government, Jan.-Mar. 1992, pages 4-8. (c) 
Steven Cohen, and Ronald Brand, Total Quality Management in Government: A Practical Guide for the 
Real World, Jossey Bass Publishers, Inc., San Francisco, CA, 1993. (d) G. Ronald Gilbert, "Human 
Resource Management Practices to Improve Quality: A Case Example of Human Resource Management 
Intervention in Government," Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2, pages 183-98. (e) 
Stephen J. Harrison, and Ronald J. Stupak, "Total Quality Management: The Organizational Equivalent of 
Truth in Public Administration, Theory and Practice," Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 
(Winter 1993), pages 416-29. (f) Henry Lefevre, ed., Government Quality and Productivity - Success 
Stories (ASQC Quality Press, Milwaukee, WI, 1992). (g) David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing 
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing, Co., Inc., Reading, MA, 1992. (h) A. K. Smith, "Total Quality Management in the Public 
Sector, Part 1", Quality Progress, Vol. 26, No. , (June 1993), pages 45- . (i) A. K.  Smith, "Total Quality 
Management in the Public Sector, Part 2," Quality Progress, Vol. 26, July 1993, pages 57- . (j) Ronald J. 
Stupak, and Rudolph B. Garrity, "Introduction," Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, Winter 
1993, pages 409-415. (k) James E Swiss, "Adapting Total Quality Management (TQM) To Government," 
Public Administration Review, Vol. 52, No. 4, July/August 1992, pages 356-62. (l) George D. Wagenheim, 
and John H. Reurink, "Customer Service in Public Administration," Public Administration Review, Vol. 
51, May/June 1991, pages 263-269. 
37 Ward Bower, “In Search of Excellence: Applying TQM to a Legal Environment,” Law Practice 
Management, vol. 19, no 3. April 1993, p. 22. “An estimated 400 of the Fortune 500 corporate law 
departments are expected to be applying TQM by 1994.” 
38 a) Aikman, Alexander B., "Total Quality Management in the Courts: The Time is Now," State Court 
Journal, vol. 17, no. 2, Spring 1993, pages 3 et seq.. b) Ehrenberg, Rudolph, Jr., and Ronald J. Stupak, 
"Administrative Theories Applicable to the Implementation of Total Quality Management in Public Sector 
and Service Organizations", An Occasional Paper Series of the Institute for Court Management of the 
National Center for State Courts (Unpublished paper) 1991. (c) Lee, Gary E., "Total Quality Management," 
The Court Management and Administration Report, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 1992. (d) Anne Thompson, 
"Total Quality Management: A Court Application," A Court Executive Development Program Phase III 
Project Report, May 1993. 
39 Lee, Gary E., "Total Quality Management," The Court Management and Administration Report, 
Vol. 3, No. 11 (November 1992). 
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40 H. Astor, Quality in Court Connected Mediation Programs: An Issues Paper (Australian Institute of 
Judicial Administration Inc, 2001) 
41 Alexander B. Aikman and Adam L. Fleischman, “Total Quality Management: Where the Courts are 
Now,” State Court Journal, Winter 1994.  
Minneapolis is the leading local government unit cited for success with TQM, but Phoenix,(a) 
Milwaukee, (b) and Los Angeles (c) also claim significant successes. And, as indicated by the 
quotations at the beginning of this chapter, courts that have tried TQM also are finding positive 
results. The Tulsa Municipal Criminal Court has documented improvements in juror attitudes 
toward service and the court. The Los Angeles Municipal Court has documented a marked 
decrease in waiting time and customer complaints since instituting its TQM program. Robert 
Quist of that court says: "In the past, the mentality was for courts to search for ways of dealing 
with angry customers; under TQM, the focus shifts to doing a good job so that there are no angry 
customers.…Suzie White of the Administrative Office of the Probate and Family Court in 
Massachusetts calls TQM ‘a common sense model for management.’ 
Citing (a) James P. Garrison, “Phoenix: A Quality City,” Public Risk, May/June 1993, page 42. (b) 
Jonathan Walters, “The Cult of Total Quality,” Governing, vol.5 no. 8, May 1992, page 38, 42. (c) Laura 
Jessee, “Productivity: Part of the Governmental Culture in Los Angeles, “ Government Finance Review, 
December 1990, page 15. 
42 Alexander Aikman, Total Quality Management in the Courts: A Handbook for Judicial Policy Makers 
and Administrators (Denver: National Center for State Courts, 1994). 
43 "A Plan for the Use of Total Quality Management in the Maine Judicial Branch," September 1, 1992. 
44 Susanne White, "Proposal for Implementing a Service Quality Improvement Plan in the Probate and 
Family Court Department of the Trial Court of the Commonwealth," State Court Journal, Winter 1994 
45 Roselle Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical 
Research, Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 2002.  
46 Jeffrey Senger, Deputy Senior Counsel for Dispute Resolution, Evaluation of ADR in United States 
Attorney Cases, United States Attorney Bulletin, November 2000, pg. 25. 
47 This idea is typically illustrated with learning archery – first get the arrows to land close to each other, 
then try to shoot for the bull’s eye. 
48 The Visiting Committee on Management in the Courts - Report to Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, 
March 2003. [http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtreformfinal.pdf] 
49 National Center for State Courts, Total Quality Management in the Courts, 1994. 
[KIS_AdmOCtTQMinCts.pdf]. Here is an excerpt from the Conclusion: 
Because TQM has been identified in the general media with the resurgence of the American 
automobile industry and several other large manufacturers have had marked success with TQM, 
some in the judicial branch have decided it is not appropriate for courts. The early pioneers with 
TQM among courts have demonstrated that is not true. TQM can apply and be helpful in courts. 
Courts that have started down the path of changing their court's management culture share the 
enthusiasm of their private sector counterparts about the value and merits of TQM. It is not a fad 
and it is not something that will disappear if we wait long enough. It is hard for some to think of 
the people who come through the courthouse doors-other than attorneys, perhaps-as "customers," 
but they are the objects and recipients of the service courts provide and thus are customers. 
Rather than diminishing the courts' mission of providing justice in individual cases and being 
perceived as providing justice, TQM can materially improve and enhance courts' service and at 
the same time enhance their capacity to fulfill that mission. 
50 Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative 
Dispute Resolution”, Prepared for the Symposium on the Vanishing Trial, Journal of Empirical Legal 
Research (July 20, 2004). 
51 Rudolph H. Ehrenberg, Jr. and Ronald J. Stupak, "Administrative Theories Applicable to the 
Implementation of Total Quality Management in Public Sector and Service Organizations," (An Occasional 
Paper Series of the Institute for Court Management of the National Center for State Courts), 1991. 
 
Many in courts who consider TQM will do so because of the prospect of budget savings. 
That subject deserves further discussion. The Federal Quality Institute reports that studies show 
that $4 to $5 are saved for every dollar invested in TQM…  
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The approach has merit, but it is not clear how many of these savings showed up as reductions in 
line items in (the) budget. In government, not all improvements in quality involve fiscal savings. 
The city of Phoenix cites two programs as positive examples of the benefits of TQM that did not 
produce any savings 
Even in state-funded judicial systems, savings representing even as much as say ten percent of a 
non-personnel item, will seem small next to the dollar savings achievable by other government 
units or larger corporations. The biggest non-personnel items in trial courts' budgets are court 
reporting transcript fees, jury fees, and indigent defense costs. While all of these are susceptible to 
savings and other out-o-fpocket costs can be limited or reduced, the magnitude of real-dollar 
savings will be limited unless a court identifies new processes that require fewer staff. This can 
happen and real dollar savings can be achieved as a result, although the nature of public-sector 
employment is that those filling the eliminated positions often will be reassigned rather than 
terminated. 
Personnel are reduced through attrition far more often than through lay offs. Courts' benefits from 
TQM are likely to be: improved productivity that will defer or eliminate future staff increases or 
enable a court to remain current with fewer staff,. 
52 National Center for State Courts with acknowledgment to the State Justice Institute (SJI), Report on 
Trends in the State Courts 1999-2000 Edition, 2000. 
[http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_CtFutu_Trends99-00_Pub.pdf] 
TQM, RIP? 
In the 1993-94 edition, we reported that total quality management (TQM) “is not a fad and…is 
not something that will disappear if we wait long enough.”* While courts are still very interested 
in providing quality customer service to court users and other goals of TQM, TQM is not 
necessarily the means that courts use to accomplish such goals. Newer processes such as strategic 
planning, data mining, and futures studies seem to have replaced TQM’s grassroots planning 
techniques. 
* quoting Alexander Aikman, Total Quality Management in the Courts: A Handbook for Judicial 
Policy Makers and Administrators (Denver: National Center for State Courts, 1994). 
53 Ann L. MacNaughton, Law Practice in the 21st Century: Assisted Negotiation and Multidisciplinary 
Problem-Solving, American Bar Association, Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Texas, 1999. The 
presentation describes the trend toward cooperative business solutions and its implications for law practice 
in the 21st Century.  
54 R. J. MacCoun, Unintended Consequences of Court Arbitration: A Cautionary Tale from New Jersey, 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice, RP-134 (originally published in The Justice System Journal, Vol. 14, No. 
2, 1991), 1992. “Arbitration programs are expected to reduce delays and costs by providing a more efficient 
substitute for trial, but because most disputes are already resolved without adjudication, an arbitration 
program is likely to divert more cases from settlement than from trial.”   
55 Sandra Azar, Jack Demick, Peter Gibbs, Permanency Mediation Pilot Programs: Impact and Outcomes, 
Center for Adoption Research, University of Massachusetts, report to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, June 30, 2000.  
56 Hedeen, Timothy, “The Evolution and Evaluation of Community Mediation: Limited Research Suggests 
Unlimited Promise,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 22(1&2): 101-133, 2004, pg. 124. 
[http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/109801328/PDFSTART] 
An additional measure of cost efficiency may be derived from the cost of services saved, that is, 
those services that were not required or delivered due to the successful resolution of concerns 
through mediation. Just as the research on the Durham center identified the potential court costs 
saved, another study has found that police referrals can lead to a decrease in return calls for 
service (Charkoudian, 2001), leading to direct cost savings for municipalities. 
57 Charkoudian, L. “Economic Analysis of Interpersonal Conflict and Community Mediation.” Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2001. 
58 Ian Heisey, Building Stronger Communities Through Mediation, Shelterforce Online, Issue #136, 
July/August 2004, a publication of the National Housing Institute. 
[http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/136/mediation.html] 
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Mediation offers an alternative to placing calls to the police and seeking prosecution or 
retaliation against neighbors. Residents learn to resolve their disputes in an assertive and 
nonviolent way, finding ways to address their differences without relying on law enforcement for 
help. 
 
When mediation is used to manage neighbor or community conflicts, police are able to devote 
their attention to more pressing law enforcement matters. A 2001study by Dr. Lorig Charkoudian, 
“Economic Analysis of Interpersonal Conflict and Mediation,” looked at the Community 
Mediation Program of Baltimore and the Baltimore Police Department and found that mediation 
saved the police department time and money. Specifically, with mediation, the police department 
saved an average of nine calls and over four hours of patrol time within a six-month period. 
59 David Green, Alison McClellan, Uncertainty, risk and children’s futures, Family Matters, No.64 Autumn 
2003. [http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fm2003/fm64/dg.pdf] 
In this opinion piece we argue that, as the Western world undergoes a period of profound 
economic and social change, insufficient attention is being paid to how that change, and the 
consequential risks and uncertainties that are generated, could be managed by governments to 
strengthen and protect families. 
We maintain that the material insecurities associated with change are likely to undermine the 
strength of relationships, so important to family stability and to children’s development. We also 
argue that the way family and children’s services are funded and delivered means that these 
problems of uncertainty and relationship instability are compounded. 
While vulnerable families have always been subject to both risk and uncertainty, the modern 
welfare state softened their impacts in the interests of stability, equity and optimising the futures 
for children. We contend that, in a period of profound change, the management of risk currently 
delivers certainty to those with social power and secure in their inclusion, at the expense of those 
unable to control their own participation in today’s economy (Taylor-Gooby 2000). This 
distribution of risk and uncertainty is of particular importance to parenting, which more than ever 
is a longterm project, requiring a firm and secure foundation in the present (Bourdieu 1998, cited 
by Bauman 2002: 177). 
In terms of outcomes, these management processes result in policy shifts from collectivising the 
response to uncertainty to relocating it within families, individuals and localities; from solving 
social problems to managing them; and from program approaches to social problems based on 
treatment to approaches based on harm minimisation (Garland 2001). And at the level of practice, 
governments are adopting radically different approaches to the funding and delivery of services, 
including the transfer of the responsibility for the delivery of services to contracted providers. All 
these changes have implications for the distribution of risk. 
Citing (a)  Taylor-Gooby, P. “Risk and welfare”, in P. Taylor-Gooby (ed.) Risk, Trust and Welfare,  
Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 2000.  (b) Z. Bauman, Society Under Siege, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002. 
(c) D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2001. 
60 Amber Hardin, The State of Community Mediation Report on 2004 Data, National Association for 
Community Mediation. 
61 Ibid. 
62 An example of a strong community partnership is in Fall River. [http://www.gfrpartners.com/healthycity.htm] 
Two example priority actions of Fall River involve preventing relationship violence and eliminating homelessness. 
These are reasonable initiatives for community mediation programs to join; community mediation can leverage these 
existing activities. For example, the privately-funded Katie Brown Educational Program [http://www.kbep.org/] 
[http://www.gfrpartners.com/05KatieBrown.html is providing education to hundreds of Fall River students in an effort 
to prevent relationship violence. Fall River has joined a growing list of cities around the country that are participating 
in a national movement to end homelessness. [http://www.gfrpartners.com/05HomelessTaskForce.html]  The project is 
based on concepts developed by the Federal Interagency Council on Homelessness [http://www.ich.gov/] and the 
National Alliance to End Homelessness [http://www.endhomelessness.org].   
63 Clear, Todd R. and David R. Karp. The Community Justice Ideal: Preventing Crime and 
Achieving Justice, Westview Press, Chicago, 2000. 
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64 Todd Clear (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, USA), Community Justice as Public Safety, Keynote 
Paper presented at the Probation and Community Corrections: Making the Community Safer Conference, 
convened by the Australian Institute of Criminology and the Probation and Community Corrections 
Officers' Association Inc., Perth, 23-24 September 2002. [http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/probation/] 
(citing Clear and Karp) 
65 Thomas O. Main, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, ADR: The New Equity, Working 
Paper 479, 2005. [http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/479] 
66 Douglas M. Gane, The Birth of a New Equity, 67 The Solicitors’ Journal & Wkly. Rptr. 572, 572 (May 
26, 1923). 
67 (a) Albie M. Davis, “An interview with Mary Parker Follett, Negotiation Journal, (July 1989). (b) Albie 
M. Davis, “Follett on facts: Timely advice from an ADR pioneer,” Negotiation Journal, (April 1991), pp. 
131-138. (c) Albie M. Davis, “Liquid Leadership: The Wisdom of Mary Parker Follett (1868 - 1933)”, 
August 1997. [http://sunsite.utk.edu/FINS/Mary_Parker_Follett/Fins-MPF-03.txt.].  
68 Mary Parker Follett, The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government, Longman 
Green and Co., New York, 1918., (now carried by Penn State University Press). 
[http://sunsite.utk.edu/FINS/Mary_Parker_Follett/Fins-MPF-01.html]. In Chapter XVI, 
[http://sunsite.utk.edu/FINS/Mary_Parker_Follett/XVI.txt], Democracy Not "Liberty" and "Equality": Our 
Political Dualism she writes:  
There has been long a kind of balance theory prevalent: everything that seems to have to do with 
the one is put on one side, everything that has to do with the many, on the other, and one side is 
called individuality and freedom, and the other, society, constraint, authority.  Then the balancing 
begins: how much shall we give up on one side and how much on the other to keep the beautiful 
equilibrium of our daily life?  How artificial such balancing sounds!  We are beginning to know 
now that our freedom depends not on the weakness but on the strength of our government, our 
government being the expression of a united people.  We are freer under our present sanitary laws 
than without them; we are freer under compulsory education than without it.  A highly organized 
state does not mean restriction of the individual but his greater liberty.  The individual is 
restricted in an unorganized state.  A greater degree of social organization means a more 
complex, a richer, broader life, means more opportunity for individual effort and individual 
choice and individual initiative.  The test of our liberty is not the number of limitations put upon 
the powers of the state.  The state is not an extra-will.  If we are the state we welcome Our 
liberty.” 
69 Hedeen, Timothy, “The Evolution and Evaluation of Community Mediation: Limited Research Suggests 
Unlimited Promise,” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 22(1&2): 101-133, 2004. Hedeen characterizes the 
supplanting of degrading social institutions with community mediation centers as follows: “The reliance on 
courts to resolve concerns was a product of many social trends. It was a project of the Department of 
Justice to pilot the concept of mediation for low-level civil and criminal matters. It began in 1978 and many 
of the centers created through the project live on. The final report on the NJC Field Test explained: 
The courts have not actively sought to become the central institution for dispute resolution; rather 
the task has fallen to them by default as the significance and influence of other institutions has 
waned over the years... Many of the disputes which are presently brought to the courts would have 
been settled in the past by the family, the church, or the informal community leadership. While the 
current role of these societal institutions in resolving interpersonal disputes is in doubt, many 
citizens take their cases to the courts. 
citing Cook, R. F., Roehl, J. A., and Sheppard, D. I. Neighborhood Justice Centers Field 
Test: Final Evaluation Report. Washington, D.C. Department of Justice, 1980. pg. 2. 
70 Such an apparent “variety” of cost savings is typically well fit by a log normal distribution, or a 
multiplicative log normal distribution. The preclusion of cost overrun in the contract model would be 
accommodated by a truncated log normal distribution. 
71 Supreme Judicial Court / Trial Court Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution for the Chief Justice 
for Administration and Management of the Trial Court, Report to the Legislature on The Impact of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution on the Massachusetts Trial Court, February 2, 1998.  
• Reduce backlog of older cases; 
• Reduce case disposition time; 
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• Expedite particular categories of cases; 
• Save judicial resources; 
• Reduce litigant costs; 
• Product high litigant satisfaction; 
• Produce high attorney satisfaction; 
• Produce high judicial satisfaction; 
• Increase pre-event dispositions; 
• Streamline litigation; 
• Find the best forum for resolving the presented and underlying issues; 
• Empower citizens to resolve their own disputes while developing conflict resolution skills that 
reduce further conflict; 
• Produce better outcomes; 
• Involve the bar and public in effective problem-solving and the administration of justice 
72 Susan Jeghelian, Executive Director, Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution, Stakeholder Input and 
Recommendations for Design for June 28th ADR Conference, Memorandum to Honorable Robert Mulligan 
Chief Justice for Administration & Management of the Trial Court and Honorable Gail Perlman, First 
Justice, Hampshire Division, Probate & Family Court, Chair of the Trial Court Standing Committee on 
Dispute Resolution, May 20, 2005. The following are findings based on interviews with court and program 
representatives regarding objectives for court ADR. 
Some, but not all, department and approved program representatives articulated goals for court 
ADR.  Many Standing Committee members were not clear on the overall goals of the system for 
court-connected ADR. There seems to be a lack of clarity around this. Some programs expressed 
an interest in talking about goals with individual courts in a more systematic way --such as an 
annual meeting to check in, see how things are going from both the court’s and the program’s 
perspectives, and establish goals for the coming year. 
The following is a list of the goals for Court ADR noted by Stakeholders:  
Case Management for the Court 
• Settling cases through ADR and earlier settlements through ADR 
• Resolving cases as early as possible through the most appropriate method 
• Honing issues and enhancing case processing through ADR 
• Streamlining case management; enhancing efficiency of court system 
• Focus priorities on courts/case types of greatest need i.e., back logs (old cases); divisions/courts 
in the worst shape (look at statistical caseload data to determine this) 
• Increase number of cases resolving through ADR  
• Increase number of referrals to ADR 
• Expand ADR more courts, wider range of case types and ADR processes 
• Having court approved ADR programs in every division that wants them – some do not 
• Expanding ADR to other case types (e.g., minor criminal cases in District Court; pro se 
cases/restraining orders in Superior Court) 
 
Quality Alternatives for Litigants and Peaceful Communities 
• Offering a range of viable options for resolution to litigants 
• Providing affordable and accessible mediation services 
• Increased satisfaction in how conflicts get resolved 
• Better administration of justice 
• Serving pro se parties effectively 
• Empowering litigants to resolve their own disputes in a professional environment; help litigants 
feel a part of the process – control over decisions, not just judge driven 
• Bringing together parties that do not often agree (e.g., DSS and parents) 
• Reducing the costs associated with litigation 
• Promoting improved satisfaction of litigants and members of the bar 
• Providing options to meet needs of wide range of litigants and issues 
• Increased compliance and create enduring resolutions which can preserve long-term relationships  
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Building Greater Acceptance of and Capacity for ADR as Core Function of Court 
• Integration and support of ADR at all levels of the court   
• ADR is treated as a core function of the court - not an add on and funding as such 
• Judges, clerks and other court personnel who know about ADR, how to use ADR and how to 
work with approved programs in their court 
• Increased visibility of ADR & ADR programs in the court house 
• Increasing public awareness of ADR in the courts 
Program goals drive decisions about design, structure, funding and other resource allocation, and 
serve as the basis for program evaluation.  Goals should be clearly articulated and prioritized. 
73 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court/Trial Court Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution in 
cooperation with the SJC Public Information Office, A Guide to Court-Connected Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Services,  section: What are the potential advantages of using court-connected 
Dispute resolution services? pg. 10.  
[http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/supremejudicialcourt/ccadr0601large.pdf] 
Savings of Time and Money 
An average lawsuit in America can take over three years to reach trial or 
settlement. Often court-connected dispute resolution proceedings can 
resolve cases in days or even hours, saving the parties from having to attend 
multiple court appearances. Parties can schedule an appointment with a 
court-connected dispute resolution service provider as soon as they choose 
their preferred dispute resolution process and provider. By resolving the 
issue early on, both parties avoid some of the costs associated with pre-trial 
litigation. 
Finality 
Resolution of disputes achieved through binding methods of court-connected 
dispute resolution is final, eliminating the long and costly process of appeal. 
Compliance 
Studies show that parties are more likely to adhere to court-connected dispute 
resolutions than to court-imposed decisions. 
Custom-Made Solutions 
Some court-connected dispute resolution proceedings, such as mediation, 
allow the parties to create their own solutions tailored to their specific needs. 
These voluntary court-connected dispute resolution processes often achieve 
resolution through the sharing of information and the development of mutual 
understanding of each party’s concerns.  
It is interesting to compare this with the guiding principles published in Report of the (Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts) Supreme Judicial Court/Trial Court Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution “Dispute 
Resolution in the Courts: A Plan to Promote Access, Choice, and Integrity in Court-Connected Dispute 
Resolution, June 18, 1996. The guiding principles are quality, integrity, accessibility, informed choice of 
process and provider, self-determination, timely services, diversity, and qualification of neutrals. 
74  The Guide pg. 11-12.  
Preservation or Enhancement of Long-Term Relationships 
Often disputes are caused by underlying issues, and court-connected dispute 
resolution processes offer the opportunity to create an enduring resolution 
that will satisfy everyone’s goals. Some conflicts are the result of deep differences 
between parties who nevertheless must sustain ongoing working relationships. For these disputes, 
some court-connected dispute resolution processes offer the opportunity to examine and resolve 
these differences so that the parties’ short-term and long-term goals may be achieved 
75 Milan Zafirovski, Some Amendments to Social Exchange Theory: A Sociological Perspective, Theory 
and Science, 2003. [http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol004.002/01_zafirovski.html ] citing 
Raymond Boudon, The Unintended Consequences Of Social Action, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1982. 
pg. 9.  
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“…homo sociologicus is “an advance over homo oeconomicus. Homo sociologicus is an 
intentional actor, endowed with a set of preferences, seeking acceptable ways of realising his 
objectives, conscious of the degree of control over the elements of the situation (of the structural 
constraints), acting in the light of limited information and in a situation of uncertainty.” 
 The key feature of the homo sociologicus model is an acknowledgement of limited rationality. 
76 The evolution from the Homo economicus model to the Homo sociologicus model, put forth by 
sociologists is reflected in a transition of the economic theory of Adam Smith to that proposed by John 
Nash. Paraphrasing succinctly: “According to Adam Smith’s theory, in competition, individual ambition 
serves the common good´, this is incomplete, ``the best result will come from everybody in the group doing 
what's best for himself, and the group´´. For this finding, backed up by mathematical rigor, John Nash was 
awarded the Nobel Prize. Avner Greif, “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: Historical and 
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,” The Journal of Political Economy, 
(October 1994); 
77 Elizabeth S. Rolph and Erik Moller, Evaluating Agency Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs: A 
Users' Guide to Data Collection and Use, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, MR-534, 1995. “Manual 
created to assist those with responsibility for evaluating federal agency alternative dispute resolution 
programs; discusses issues in designing evaluations, lays out approaches to data collection, provides sample 
data analysis plans, and includes a number of prototype data collection instruments.” 
78 Melinda Ostermeyer, and Susan Keilitz, Monitoring and Evaluating Court-Based Dispute Resolution 
Programs, National Center for State Courts, SJI, 1997. 
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